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Abstract 
The intemational climate regime、 primarily designed to lim Ít the emissions of poJlutants 
causing global wamling, has failed. Why has intemational cooperation to combat global 
wamling been so difficult, and what factors must change to improve the situation-assuming 
it is even possible? Using Mancur Olson's classical theory of collective action, this essay 
endeavors to explain the failure of the climate regime. Other intemational environmental 
agreements and the associated regimes , such as the Mediterranean Action Plan and the 
Montrea\ Protocol on ozone depletion、 demonstrate that collective action to address 
inte ll1ational environmental problems is possible. Both agreements contain the ingredients 
that c1 assical theory suggests are necessary to achieve collective action. But the f1 ipside of 
collective action theory-that collective action in larger groups is 叮叮 difficult or 
unlikely--can also apply to intemational agreements and action on climate change. Despite 
the Mediterranean and Montreal successes, relatively speaking, and in spite of 50 much effort 
over two decades to create an effective climate regim巳 it is by no means apparent that the 
elements for success will exist for the foreseeable future . We should expect a continued 
muddling along that may, at best、 reduce slightly-but not reverse-global wanning at some 
point in the relatively distant 仇lture . Climate change is with us to stay 
Facing Reality: Pernicious Obstacles to Collective Action on Climate Change 
lt is now patently clear that the world is facing a growing set of environmental dangers. The 
greatest among them is probably cJ ill1ate change一一changes to Earth's climate systell1, 
manifested in events such as drought, f1oods , sea-level rise , major temperature rises in some 
regions (e.g. , the Artic) and potentially precipitous faJJs in others (e.g. , Europe) , extinction of 
species and spread of pests (to give but a sa ll1pling of the myriad adverse impacts of climate 
change ).1 Climate change arises from global wam1Îng, which is caused by humankind's 
polllltion ofthe atmosphere with greenhollse gases (GHGs), notably carbon dioxide coming 
from the bllrning of fossil fue1s. 2 This human-induced global wanning was, until recently, 
viewed as a.fulure prob1em. But we are now coming to realize that ongoing climatic changes 
are very probably consequences of globa1 warming.3 The internationa11egal instruments 
intended to avert dangerous interference with the Earth's climate-the stated aim of the 
Framework Convention on C1imate Change (FCCC)一is increasingly about mitigating that 
dangerolls interference and plltting in place mechanisms for adapting to it 
International cooperation is required to address climate change because it is caused by 
poJJution originating in countless locations in every country of the WOl吋， and its 
consequences will be so ha1111ful that on1y with internàtional assistance wiU the weakest and 
poorest peoples and states be able to adapt to future environmental conditions. Climate 
change is a coJJective action proble ll1. As Duncan Snide1 points out, "The problem of 
inte l11ationa1 cooperation is essentially one of collective action applied to the pm1icular 
circumstances of the international system. ,,4 Although there are many constraints that tend to 
limit collective action, especiaJJy among disparate states, there have been a few instances in 
which intemational enviro l1mental cooperatiol1 has been relative1y successfu l. Among these 
ll1stances are the Mediterranean Action Plan (Med Plan) for reducing poJJution ofthe 
Mediterranean Sea and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
a l1 agreement for limiting damage to the earth's protective layer of stratospheric ozone 
Climate change has required , and will continue to require, similar international cooperation, 
but on a verγmuch greater scale. 
About two decades ago , governments came to recognize the need for just such 
coopel刮ion ， and in 1992 most of them signed the FCCC. Tl1e core objective of the FCCC is 
"stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to aIIow ecosystems to adapt naturally to c1 imate 
change、 to ensllre that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development 
to proceed in a sustainable manner.川 Diplomats subsequently negotiated the Kyoto Protocol 
to the FCCC, which requires developed country parties to reduce their emissions of GHGs by 
abollt 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012 . However, not all developed countries are pm1ies 
to the Kyoto agreement. Most notably, the United States (US), the source of about 
one-qua11er of the pollutants causing global wam1Ïng, has refused to rati方 the agreement 
(although the Clinton administration signed the treaty in 1992), and over the last half decade 
under President George W. Bush it has sought to undennine it at eve可 tum
Scientists te lJ us that emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs must be cut by at 
Jeast 60 percent just to stabilize thcir concentrations in the atmosphere and to prevent chaos 
川 the global cJimate system.(, Yet、 even with fu Il implementation as negotiated among the 
pal11郎、 the Kyoto Protocol will resuJt in reductions of well under 5 percent of parties' 
e11l1ssions because the manner in which parties are allowed to meet their commitments (e .g. , 
em1ss lO11S tl叫ing and land-use changes ["carbon sinks"]) will not in fact result in significant 
national emissions cuts . The Kyoto Protocol is, at best, a small (but potentially very 
llnportant) baby step toward greater action. 1n the meantime, global GHG emissions will 
2 
continue to rise precipitously, notably because large developing countries (especially China 
and lndia), along with the US , wi l1 be increasing their use of fossil fuels as their economies 
grow. Climate change will continuc, virtua l1y unabated, short of new, l11uch 1110re aggressive 
collective action to reduce GHGs. However, strong signals of the more robust action needed 
are distinct in their absence. The best that we can expect at present is a muddling along that 
wi l1, at best, slightly reduce global wanning at some point in the relatively distant future. 
Despite the Kyoto Protocol entering into force in February 2005 、 the climate regime has been 
a failure. 
What explains this failure? Why has intemational cooperation to combat global warming 
been so difficult, and what factors must change to improve the situation 一吋r is significant 
improvement even likcly? Using Mancur Olson's theory of co l1ective action (CAT),7 this 
artic\e endeavors to explain the failure of the climate regime to stabilize, let along 
significantly cut, emissions ofGHG po l1utants. The Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol 
demonstrate that classical CAT is applicable to international environmental problems. Both 
agreements contain some of the ingredients that Olson says are necessary to achieve 
collective action. But the f1 ipside ofthe theory-that collective action in large groups is 
unlikely-also applies to intemational environmental cooperation. Despite the Mediterranean 
and Montreal successes (at least compared to climate change), it is by no means apparent that 
the elements for success will exist for climate change in the foreseeable 臼仙re
Other theories could be brought to bear, and indeed have been, to show the complex, 
multi-Ievel factors shaping cooperation on transnational environmcntal issues, including 
c1 imate change.~ But even basic attributes of cooperation highlighted by CAT are lacking in 
the climate regime, while the obstac\es highlighted by the theory are manifest. Classical CAT, 
despite its limits, was enough to predict the failure of c\ imate regime even in its earliest days, 
and it points to some issues that need to be addressed as more complex frameworks are used 
to find ways of provoking the much greater cooperation that is required in the future . One 
pnmarγaim of this article, then, is to show that the c1 imate regime faces some of the most 
fundamental obstacles to cooperation. This is not to say that all ofthe research on 
intemational enVirOIUuental cooperation (inc1uding my own, 1 hope9) that has gone well 
beyond classical CAT has been for naught. To the contrary, many of the answers to this 
collective action problem are indeed found in domestic politics, multiple levels of analysis 
and so forth . But the focus ofthese newer approaches are a bitlike explaining the integrity of 
a building by focusing on its occupants and furnishings , or at perhaps its internal wa l1s and 
the personalities of neighbors, while ignoring that it lacks a proper foundation and is built on 
loose ground. Classical CAT is no longer cachet among students of global environmental 
politics, to be sure‘ but it is still quite helpful in explaining why international cooperation and 
development of robust intemational law on c1imate change-or, more precise句， international 
action to do something about it-remains extremely difficult. lt helps bring us back to basics. 
The remainder of this articIe consists of five sections. The first section describes a 
number offeatures ofOlson's CAT. The second and third sections look at the Med Plan and 
the Montreal Protocol, with emphasis 011 some of the factors that contributed to relatively 
successful collective action in those areas. The fourth section examines the issue of climate 
change and references CAT to explain the lack of a more robust intemational regime to 
prevent it. 1 then CO l11l11ent on the prospects for the cI il11ate regime. Some of the "early" 
literature 011 cli l11ate change cooperation fro111 the late 1980s and early 1990s is cited here to 
show that it was prescient in anticipating the difficulties of collective action, demonstrating 
that we could faÌI句 predict the likelihood (or not) of collective action in this issue area , 
despite all of the complicated theoretical work done in recent years 
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Collective Action Thcory 
On the final page ofthe oft-cited 刃惚。'Y oflnlernational Politics, Kenneth Waltz reaffinns 
the imp0l1anCe of collective action: "collective efforts are needed if common problems are to 
be solved or somehow managed."IO He acknowledges that "global problems can be solved by 
110 nation singly, only by a number of nations working together，川 I and he reaffirrns the need 
to gamer an understanding of collective action and the extent to which it is possible in 
relations among states. The notion of the collective action problem is not a new one. 
Rousseau describes it in his Second Discourse when he writes of "the rare occasions when 
common interest should make [a man] count on the assistance ofhis fellow men. . . .,, 12 Jn 
his well-known story of the stag hunt, Rousseau tells us that men could acquire the 
idea of l11utual engagements and of the advantages of fulfilling them, but only 
insofar as present and perceptible interest could require; for foresight meant 
nothing to them , and far fr0111 being concemed about a distant fu仙悶， they did not 
even think ofthe next day. Was it a matter of catching a deer, everγone clearly felt 
that for this pu中ose he ought faithfully to keep his post; but if a hare happened to 
pass within reach of one of them, there can be no doubt that he pursued it without 
scruple, and that havi月 obtained his prey, he cared veηlittle about having caused 
his c0111panions to miss theirs. 13 
Thus Rousseau introduces us to the difficulty ofundertaking collective action 
ln the introduction to his seminal work，刃:Ie Logic ofCollective Action, Mancur Olson 
points to a c0 I11111only held belief: assuming that they are rational , self-interested actors, 
everγone in a group with a common interest will act collectively to achieve that comlTIon 
interest. 14 But，的 Olson shows , this is actually not the case; empirical evidence does not 
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support this apparently logicai view of collective action. 15 Absent incentives separate from 
the good being sought, rational actors will not necessarily act collectively to achieve a 
common good that they all have an interest in obtaining. This is true even if the actors 
involved have reached a consensus on what the good is and how best to achieve it (a 
condition that is, astonishingly, still absent from the climate change question, at least in the 
US where there are stiU influential cJ imate skeptics-President George W. Bush apparently 
among them-who discount the problem while finding it increasingly difficult to deny its 
importance). As Olson argues, "unless the number ofindividuals in a group is quite small, or 
unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, ralional se!f- inlereSled individuals willnot acllo achieν'e fheir common 0 ,. group 
,, 16 1111eresls. .. 
To explain this phenomenon, it is useful to highlight some of the underlying logic and 
principles associated with Olson's theory. A "common" or "collective" good is one 出at is 
available to everγindividual ， regardless ofwhether or not he or she pays for it. Collective 
goods have two characteristics: "if they are available to one countrγthey are available to all 
countries (access cannot be restricted), and one country's use ofthe good does not reduce its 
availability to others. ,, 17 Collective goods are those that are characterized by "jointness" of 
supply and the impossibility of exclusion. 1 K Here we are interested in the protection of 
collective goods-a stable cJ imate system-from collective "bads," namely atmospheric 
pollution and its consequences. As Hardin indicates, "co l\ective action problems, especially 
those that are political issues, have as their best outcomes the elimination of hann rather than 
the provision of good or goods." 19 
E ven if there is a common interest in a collective good being sought by a group , there is 
seldom a common interest in paying for that good. Each member o[ the group wants other 
members to pay the costs of providing it because, by definition , each member will benefit 
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fro l11 the good regardless of whether or not he pays for it. As Waltz characterizes it,"all have 
reason to hang back, hoping that others wiU bear the costs-something that nobody may have 
an incentive to do. ,,20 According to Oran Young, "rational egoists operating in the absence of 
effective 11l1es or social conventions often fail to realize feasible joint gains and end Up with 
outcomes that are suboptimal (sometimes dramatically so) for a11 concemed. ,,21 As Hardin 
suggests, "many of those who want their co l1 ective interests to be served may weigh their 
own self-interests heavily, even too heavily to cooperate in serving their collective 
.22 interests.' 
Some scholars believe that cooperation is somewhat easier than Olson's CAT suggests. 
For instance‘ Robel1 Keohane has said that, although cooperation is rare in world politics, it is 
possible even among rational , self-interested actors if they are concemed about their 
23 
reputations or if an intemational institution exists to facilitate cooperation."'J The question is 
whether pressure can be brought to bear effectively and what those institutions 111u5t look like 
to bring about cooperation. 
Using Olson's definition, a "group" is understood to mean "a number of individuals with 
a common interest. ,,24 Here this definition is expanded to cover nation-states. In so doing, we 
assume that states seek to use rational means to achieve their desired ends; they are rational , 
self-interested, more-or-less unitary actors with motivations similar to those of the individuals 
in Olson's groups.25 Olson describes three types of groups:2屆(1)、rivileged" groups in 
which each member is willing to pay for provision of the collective good; (2) 叮ntennediate"
s111a11 groups in which no one member has an interest in bearing the costs of providing the 
good 、 but in which there is some possibility for cooperation because the members are unable 
to recognize those who are "free riding"; and (3) "latent" large groups in which the collective 
good will not be provided unless one member is willing to absorb the costs of doing so, short 
of selective Încentives . Olson describes a large group that has been energized by selective 
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incentives as a "mobilized" latent group. 
Some s111all groups can undertake collective action without coercion or positive 
incentives. Ifone member (or subgroup ofmembers) ofthe group gets a large enough portion 
of the benefits of providing the pllblic good to make paying for all or 1110St of it worthwhile, 
he or she will be willing to pay mllch (or all) ofthe costs ofaction.27 Impo口ant旬， however, 
the benefit going to the member(s) paying for the good must exceed the cost being paid by 
the member(s) willing to bear the costs. But, as Olson suggests, the provision ofthe collective 
good by these sma l1 groups will 110t be optimal , despite the fact that optimal provision would 
be in the interests ofa1ll11embers ofthe groUp.28 Sub-optimal provision ofthe good results 
because those members who do not pay for the collective good still benefit from it. This 
phenomenon becollles more important as the group gets larger. 
Three factors conspire to prevent large groups fro l11 undertaking collective action that 
wOllld further the interests of the grollp戶 First ， the larger the group, the less benefit each 
member receives and the further the group is frolll providing an optimal supply ofthe 
collective good. Second, because of the small benefit each member of a large group receives , 
there is little likelihood that any one me l11ber (or a few members) will pay the cost of 
providing even SOllle of the good. Finally, larger groups are 1ll0re expensive to start and 
operate, thereby creating an economic obstacle to collective action. The upshot is that, "In a 
large, latent group there wi l1 be no tendency for the group to organize to achieve its goals 
through the voluntary, rational action of the members of the group , even if there is perfect 
consensus. Thus, according to Olson, in the absence of coercion or incentives beyond or 
outside the good being sOllght, large groups 叭' ill not provide a collective good. 
Olson tells us that the typical pal1icipant in a large grollp will be lInwilling to devote 
energies sllfficient to optima l1y further the group's goals because each participant's 
cO l1 tributio l1 will be relatively small and the resultant benefit to that individllal will be 
exceeded by the cost of his efforts. lt is for this reason, "among others, that organizations so 
often turn to the small group; committees, sub-committees, and smallleadership groups are 
created、 and OllCe created they tend to play a crucial role. ,, 30 As Olson points out, '''action 
taking' groups and subgroups tended to be much smaller than 'non-action taking' groups and 
subgroups. [S]ma lJ groups could act more decisively and use their resources more effectively 
than large groups. . . . ,, 31 Coml11 ittees and working groups should be small to be effective 
According to Olson, in order for the individuals in a large group to undertake the costs 
of collective action there must be some S0I1 of sanction or incentive distinct from the good 
being sought: "Only a separate and selective incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a 
latent group to act in a group oriented way.ρ2 As Keohane points out, the success of some 
large groups can be explained by their having provided private goods as a by-product of 
membership.33 The incentive-either positive or negative一must work selectively on 
s individuals in the group, not on the group as a whole. Groups can use negative induce白me臼nt心
ag伊a剖inst those i吋ividuals not joini時 in action, and give positive inducements or rewards to 
those who do. A variety of incentives are possible to foster group participation and 
cooperatlOl1只 Perhaps the most common category of incentives would be one that brings 
economic benefit-or difficulty-to the recipien t. Other moral, psychological or social 
incentives could also prove useful in gamering support for collective action. For instance, the 
prestíge 、 respect and friendship associated with group membership may help induce an 
individual to pm1icipate. Likewise, ostracism from the circle of individuals comprising the 
group l11ay help push a 110n-participant to join the group and contribute toward achievement 
of the collcctive good 
OISOI1 suggests that social incentives will only work in small groups or large "federal" 
groups (federations of sl11aller groups). Olson does qualify this point by suggesting that mass 
media propaganda may be a social incentive capable of 1110bilizing large groups: "lf the 
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members of a latent group are somehow continuously bombarded with propaganda about the 
worthiness ofthe attempt to satisfy the common interest in question, they may perhaps in 
time develop social pressures not entirely unlike those that can be generated in a face-to-face 
,35 group , and these social pressures may help the latent group to obtain the collective good.' 
As the story of the Montreal Protocol suggests (see below) , the media can be an important 
stimulant fo1' collective action. lnfonnation is also important to cooperation. According to 
Hardin, "the degree of cooperation may depend on the quality of knowledge generally 
available. ,,36 Keohane argues that collective action is especially difficult when "uncertainty is 
great and actors have different access to infonnation. . . . ,, 37 Info l111ation proved to be a 
critical factor in the creation ofthe Mediterranean cleanup and ozone-protection regimes 
lnformation is proving to be even I110re critical for climate change 
Arild Underdal has suggested a "law ofleast ambitious program," which sU I11l11arizes 
ll1 uch of Olson's logic: "where intemational management can be established only through 
agreement among all significant parties involved, and where such a regulation is considered 
only on its own merits, collective action will be limited to those measures acceptable to the 
least enthusiastic pa口y， [but that pa口y may join if there are adequate] argUI11ents, 
side-payments, or various kinds of political pressure. ,, 38 The upshot is that parties will hold 
back, even if they have strong interests in acting collectively. They have to be pushed rather 
bard to join in if the costs of doing so are more than modest 
Protecting the Mediterranean Sea 
Amon旦 successful international enviromnental agreements are the Montreal Protocol and , 
albeit less so、 the Mediterranean Action Plan. The former is effective because collective 
action has been sufficiently robust for scientists to predict that ozone depletion will be 
reversed and reduced, with the st!割的pheric ozone layer expected to recover over the next 50 
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years or SO.39 The latter has been l1l0destly e tTective because it has resulted in a set of 
cooperative arrangements, monitoring and regulation over a large and extraordinarily 
正hsparate group of states‘ thereby limiting the impact of myriad pollution sources 011 the 
MeditelTanean Sea. Both the Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol contain requisites for 
collective action discussed by Olson, especially selective incentives or side-payments. These 
international agree l11ents can tell us a great deal about the efficacy of CAT in the 
environmental context、 and how his theOIγrelates to the c\ imate regime. 
Pollution of the MeditelTanean was perceived to be a collective goods problem because 
pollutants from states bordering the sea were thought to be washing up on other states' 
beaches叩 This perception contributed ultimately to creation of the Med Plan , a regime that 
is "a collectively negotiated, ongoing set of arrangements for the progressive control of 
Mediterranean marine pollution. ,,41 Negotiated and agreed in the l11 id-1970s, the Med Plan is 
the product of the Barcelona CO l1vention for the Protection of the Mediterranean against 
Po l\ution. The plan brought together littoral states and the then European Community to 
protect the sea's environment and, later, to pro l110te environmentally sustainable development 
in the Meditemmean region. The plan now comprises a host of cooperative arrangements 
among about two dozen governments and the European Union, working with the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and nongovernmental actors, in a "coordinating unit" 
(secretariat) and regional activity centers戶
Not all analysts have described the Med Plan as successful given its apparently modest 
impacts on polluting behaviors.43 However, according to Peter Haas, who pioneered research 
011 It 、 the Med Plan has been 
Illoderately successful because it induced member governments to take new policies that 
enhanced environmental quality in the region, and that those govemments would not 
1I 
have adopted in the absence ofthe Med Plan. While the environmental data is choppy 
and not very good, it does appear to be the case . . . that the Med is certainly no worse in 
quality that in was before the Med Plan, and that the level of coastal population and 
economic activity has doubled or tripled in the intervening years. Not to mention the 
unintentional and unanticipated effects of establishing a political model for multilateral 
44 
cooperahon 
Thus the Med Plan has done what the climate regime is supposed to have done: “abilize 
pollution despite economic growth. 
Several factors contributed to collective action to address Mediterranean pollution. 
Contrary to some other scholars, Haas declares that "coercion, public opinion, and 
anticipation ofbenefits do not fu l1y explain the extent of compliance," although these were 
important contributing factors.45 He suggests that the most significant factor leading to 
co lIective action and the Med Plan was the existence of "epistemic communities," which he 
describes as "ecologists and marine scientists who set the intemational agenda and directed 
their own states toward suppo口 of intemational efforts and toward the introduction of strong 
po lIution cOlltrol measures at home."的 According to Haas, the success of epistemic 
communities in this instance can be largely attributed to their ability to increase 
"govemmentalleaming," a process whereby scientists and ecologists informed domestic and 
foreign policy makers about the extent of the problem so as to elicit their interest in 
protecting the Mediterranean. The process Haas outlines is complex、 but it is based 011 a 
professional campaign to spread infonnation, and on the power that is frequently associated 
with infonnatioll. As Olson suggested, infonnation eases the move to collective action.47 
An important additional factor contributing to the success of the Med Plan negotiations 
included the involvement of an intemational organization, namely UNEP. UNEP provided 
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information and resources from its Regional Seas Program. UNEP also served as a 
coordinator, enabling scientists and diplomats to pool their efforts toward the goal of a 
c\eaner Medite叮anean. Through its efforts UNEP helped the littoral states reduce transaction 
costs and assisted them in opening additional diplomatic channels, thereby easing the move 
toward co l\ective action.4R This function is analogous to Olson's smallleadership forums . 
Haas's account fu口her demonstrates the salience of Olson's basic CAT. Selective 
incentives were used to promote cooperation. Monitoring and research provisions of the Med 
Plan gave symbolic recognition to Mediterranean states' scientific stature. Research fllnds , 
technology and scienti日c eqllipment were transferred fro l11 the developed to the developing 
participants in the plan. UNEP spread pollution-control construction contracts arollnd the 
Mediterranean and hired consultants and distributed offices in such a way that the states most 
resistant to joining the plan benefited from it.49 
Haas believes that epistemic communities and UNEP were sufficiently able to in f1uence 
states for them to "recaJculate their interests in light of new infonnation, or as they are 
penetrated by new groups. Thus, following such involvement, govemments were able to 
overcome the domination of stronger states, and smaller states recognized the need to protect 
the Mediterranean. ,,50 The important components of the Med Plan's modest success-
eplstemic com l11unities and UNEP-helped form a consensus and provided crucial 
in[01111ation. These factors then led to the creation of a regime that had a variety of incentives 
as part of its structure. Thus, the Med Plan shows the utility of key components ofCAT in the 
context of intemational environmental cooperation. Having said that, the Med Plan has its 
own weaknesses, not least its attempt to control so many pollutants over such a wide area 
with too few resources, and the involvement of so many actors that coordination among them 
is difficul t. 51 This is a waming to those who are negotiating the cJ imate regime that must 
fo l1 ow the Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2008-2012) 
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Pr叭'enting Stratospheric Ozone Depletion 
The stratospheric ozone ìs a layer of gas surrounding the earth that filters dangerous 
u \traviolet radiation fr0111 the sun. Several chemicals emitted into the atmosphere-
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting chemicals (ODCs)-deplete thìs layer. 
Among the adverse effects of this depletìon are increased levels of skin cancer and eye 
cataracts、 crop damage and hann to the l11arìne food chain, including fisheries. S2 According 
to Richard Benedick (then chìef US dìplomat ìn the ozone negotiations) , the Montreal 
Protocol addresses "an unprecedented global ecological threat, one that required govem l11ents 
to balance distant but possibly catastrophic dangers against the ve可 real short-run economic 
dislocations that would be caused by preventive measures."S3 These factors-potentially 
catastrophic dangers and econo l11 ic dislocations-are also applicable to the climate regime. 
Benedìck defined the dilem l11a of protecting the COm1110n good of stratospheric ozone: 
"The VeIγnature of ozone depletion meant that no single country or group of countries, 
however powerful, could effectively solve the problem. Without far-ranging cooperation , the 
effolis of some natìons to protect the ozone layer would be vitiated. ,,54 The obstacles facing 
those wanting to develop an intemational regime to address ozone depletion were immense. 
lndustrial interests, scientific uncertainties and technological hurdles were standing in the 
way of collectìve action. Nevel1heless, an agreement to act collective\y was reached and 
ultimately strengthened at subsequent meetings of parties to the protoco l. 
Benedick attributed the success of the Montreal Protoco\ to several factors. Like Haas, 
he gives l11uch credit to scientìsts (Haas's epistemic communities) who were active in 
working groups set up to determine provisions of the treaty. According to Benedick's account、
"Close collaboration between scìentists and key government officia\s who became convinced 
of the long-term dangers ultimately prevaìled over 1110re parochial and short-run ìnterests of 
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national politicians. ,, 55 lt was partly due to the influence of scientists that politicalleaders 
took action on ozone despite there still being considerable uncertainty about the full nature of 
the problel11. Scientists, along with environmental nongovern l11ental organizations, also 
pl ayed a role in educating the public, thereby l110bilizing public opinion and prompting l11edia 
attention. Additionally, leadership ofthe US govemment and (as with the Med Plan) UNEP 
(and its head、 Mustafa Tolba) were "critical in 1110bilizing an international consensus.,, 5(i US 
leadership was evident in its preemptive action to limit emissions of ODCs. This action 
created al1 environ l11ent in which industry had an economic incentive to find a technological 
solution to the problem (namely, substitutes for ODCs, which US industlγwas first to 
develop). 
Another very important factor contributing to collective action on ozone were 
side-payments offered to poorer countries that l11ight not otherwise accede to the agreement. 
The protocol calls for developed countries to "facilitate access" to financial assistance and the 
technologies necessary to produce substitutes for ODCs. Among other incentives geared 
toward convincing states to join the protocol , the European Coml11 unity was allowed to 
aggregate its consumption limits to the benefit of individualmembers, the Soviet Union was 
allowed to use CFC plants already under construction, small-scale producers of ODCs were 
pemlitted to transfer production increases among themselves, and developing countries were 
allowed to continue producing CFCs for a substantial additional period of time.57 In addition 
to such positive incentives, the treaty called for the gradual prohibition of purchases of ODCs 
and products produced with or containing them . Such prohibitions imposed sanctions on 
states outside the protocol that might exploit the end to production of ODCs by parties to it. 
Furthennore, a ll1ultilateral ozone fund司 paid for by wealthy govemments, was created to 
assist developing-country parties in switching to ODC alternatives. 
The ozone regime demonstrates the importance of 0lson'5 sma1l working groups and 
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cOJ11 mittees. As Benedick repeatedly argues, it was the work of such groups that provided the 
basis [or 50 111uch of the success at Montrea l. He points out that the "complicated ozone 
protection issue was separated into manageable components, and infonl1al collaborative 
efforts-workshops, conferences, consultations一一laid the foundation for the eventual 
intemational consensus. ,, 58 11l1portantly, the Montreal ozone agreement was purposely made 
flexible in order to re f1ect fu山re changes in the scientific knowledge or the poIitical 
consensus; the agreement, "far from being a static solution . . . .constitutes an ongoÌng 
process. ,, 59 lndeed, in subsequent 1l1eetings of the parties, restrictions 011 ODCs were 
increased, as were specific fina l1cial incentives and trade disincentives to bring new members 
into the effort 
The Montreal Protocol fulfills many of Olson's criteria for collective action. lncentiv白，
disincentives, infonl1ation , leadership, small groups and iterated diplomatic engagement all 
played their parts in fostering cooperation, and indeed extending and deepening it as the 
problem became better understood. There are lessons here for the climate regime , although 
ozone depletion is a vastly simpler problem to address than is global wanning 
Protecting the C1 imate System 
Most or possibly all countries will be affected by climate change, most (and probably all) of 
them in adverse ways.('O Consequently, most ofthem have an interest in collective action that 
will limit the emissions of GHGs polluting the Ealih's atmosphere , and concerted action is 
required to address it. lt was clear to diplomats as they entered ne皂otiations for the FCCC in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s th3t dealing effectivcly with climate change would require the 
creation of an intemational regime in which 1l10st of the world's govemments would agree to 
act collectively to reduce the emissions of GHGs. However, the number of countries making 
major contributions to the problem is quite large and growing、 and the costs of doing 
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something significant about it are high (at least to many economic sub-sectors). What is more, 
many govemments were not convinced that it would be in their immediate interests to pay 
those costs, and ma叮 still retain this view. As George Rathjens suggested well a decade an 
a ha叫lf ago, "even putting aside the complicating fact of great uncertainty, getting agreement 
011 some instmmentality to insure that everyone-or at least a significant number-makes an 
appropriate contribution to a group effort to achieve the benefits of a well-rnaintained 
commons will be more difficult than in the usual case" of commons problem.6 ) How right 
Rathjens was. 
To achieve an effective climate regime it is necessary to address the constraints placed 
on collective action outlined by Olson. The Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol suggest that 
collective action on climate change is possible ~fthese constraints can be overcome. 
Agreement depends on achieving some consensus regarding the nature and magnitude of 
global warming and resulting climatic changes, the best ways to mitigate them and cut 
pollution causing them , and how best to pay for doing so. lt has been fairly clear from the 
beginning that if one large country or group of states were wi l1 ing to assume much of the 
costs of collective action, or if sufficient incentives could be offered to participants, then 
intemational cooperation on climate change could take place. Unfortunately, climate change 
has so far fit pemiciously into OIS011'S "indetenninate" category, whereby no single 
intemational actor has perceived a sufficiently large benefit from the collective good to 
justify paying 1110St of the costs of providing it, but in which its contribution to the problem is 
so large tbat its failure to participate is central to effective action.62 The Europeans seem 
willing to take 011 this burden ,c,3 but actualizing that wi l1ingness is not yet significant from 
the perspective of affecting global GHGs、 and at times it seems tenuous. That 此， collective 
action on climate change remains problematic-at best 
Scientists agree that GHGs are responsible for wam1ing the planet more than would 
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occur without such po l1l1tants, and they agree that concentrations of these gases are increasing 
at "unprecedentedly rapid rates."“ There are very few exceptions to this accepted wisdom , 
but where "cI imate skepticism" does exist, mostly in the US, its impact on policy has been 
disproportionately great, although this seems to be slowly changing as news repo口s of 
changing climate and its impacts become more com l11on. However, fairly significant 
uncertainty and some disagreement remain on the specifìc inψacts of cI imate change. Thus 
Thomas Schelling was right to conclude even before the FCCC was negotiated that 
"Uncertainties are hllge, and most ofthem will persist.的5 Despite the scientific consensus, 
there is not‘ even now, a political consensus among the world's govemments on the threat 
posed by climate change. Most of them agree with the FCCC's general notion that we have a 
problem that mllst be dealt with, but this still runs Up against the difficulties of ac山ally
allocating the responsibilities and costs of doing something about it. Political actors have 
pushed sufficiently hard to thwart the development of a consensus in the US and a few other 
developed countries (e .g. , Australia), as well as in some major developing countries, because 
they do not yet see the adverse consequences as being great enough to justi身 what they 
perceive to be the short-teml costs of taking action. Like in the case of ozone depletion. there 
is disagreement, but in this case it is much more important because the costs for some groups 
of people, inOuential industries and economic sectors, if not for wbole countries, of meeting 
the provisions of an effective climate regime are vastly greater than the costs of the ozone 
(,(. 
protection regime."{\ Unwillingness to act is dissipating, but much too slowly to prevent what 
seems to be.σ/rca吋九 九langerous anthropogenic intcrference in the climate system'的7 (to 
panot the FCCC) 
The costs of preventing cI imate change are immediate、 but the benefits will nol be seen 
for many decades. However, the cost-benefit ratio must be viewed as favorable before actors 
wiJJ join in strong collective action.(,H This suggests that most govemments will not be 
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willing to make the major sacrifices necessarγto effect a halt to (let alone reverse) global 
wanning.(,t) As classical CAT points out, for large groups, if the costs of action are high、
collective action is not likely; the larger the contribution that each member of the group m l1st 
provide to achieve the collective good, the less likelihood there is for collective action. 70 
This is not rocket science, but it is a basic idea that is sometimes ignored by those who, quite 
JUstl日ably， vociferously demand aggressive co l\ective intemational action on climate change 
Classical CAT te l\s us that groups having access to selective incentives will be more 
Jikely to act co J1 ectively than will those not having such incentives,71 thus explaining, at least 
in part, the relative successes of the Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol. lt will be 
inordinately difficu \t to achieve more effective intemational cooperation on c1 imate change 
without similar provisions for coercion (negative inducements) and side payments (positive 
inducements). Selective incentives commonly used in environmental treaty bargaining are 
access to funding, resources, markets and technology.72 The developing countries have made 
it clear that they want to be "paid" for their participation in a cJ imate regime. The requested 
payments include access to expe口s and technology, training of indigenous scientists and 
technicians. and grants to aid development in general and adherence to the regime in 
particular. 73 Effective action to prevent global warming in wi l\ arguably "require resource 
transfers . . . greater than all of the foreign aid, m l1It ilateral and bilateral aid in current 
programs .,, 74 Positive inducements include the transfer oftechnology and íinancial aid from 
the deveJoped world to the developing world , as was done in the Med Plan and as has been 
incorporated into provisions for impJementing the Kyoto Protoco l. But the la t1er efforts have 
been feebJe so fat\failing to provide positive inducements to strong action . Incentives will 
have to be strengthened mightily and given vastly more financiaJ backing. Coercion might 
come În the form of trade penaJties‘ similar to those found in the Montreal Protocol 
The economÎc resources to provide financial aid (bribes) to deveJoping countries might 
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come from a carbon tax imposed on those members of the regime that are producing the most 
GHGs per capita. Carbon taxes were proposed in the early 1990s as one of the selective 
incentives that might be useful in any c1 imate regime. Such taxes would provide an incentive、
albeit negative , for improved efficiency and could provide tinancial resources to assist the 
poorer participants in the regime. However, as ScheIIing predicted at the time, it was never 
likely that an international carbon tax would be implemented.75 He pointed out that such a 
tax would cost the US alone we lI in excess of$125 biIIion,76 and he "utterly dismiss[ed] the 
possibility that the United States would contribute in any such fashion . . . upwards of $1 00 
biIIion per year, or that the Senate would rati 月， any treaty incurring such financial 
,77 conunitments." " For the US, despite it being the world's most profligate global poIIuter, the 
notion of an intemational carbon tax is a complete non-sta口er. The lack of a tax means there 
is no strong negative inducemcnt for the greatest developed-country poIIuters to cut GHG 
emissions. What is more, without some kind of global source of money that a universal 
carbon tax could provide、 the international funds that have been created to induce countries to 
take the climate regime seriously一-some financing from the Global Environment Facility, 
along with the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Country Fund and the 
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund一-arguably wiII never have enough resources to persuade 
111叮 or developing countries to join coIIective action on climate change. lndeed, the growing 
use of funds to help them adapt to climate change may have the perverse effect of giving 
them some incentive to avoid limiting GHG poI\ution 
Alternative strategies much less anathema to the US govemme肘， such as emissions 
trading, have so far achieved verγlittlc in the way of GHG emissions reductions 
Gove l11ment-mandated trading of carbon dioxide emissions began in the European Union in 
January 20的、 and infonnal trading has been going on for some time in London and Chicago 
These efforts hold promise for reducing GHG emissions , but the emissions limits underlying 
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them will have to be profoundly increased if there is to be significant movement toward 
meeting the FCCC's objective of stabilizing emissions and preventing even more upset to the 
Ea口h's climate system than is already guaranteed by past emissions. This profound increase 
in GHG emissions limitations is not foreseen at present. Successful collective action is 
unlikely in the near futu間， especially ifthe US remains willing to enthusiastically participate. 
Even coercion is unlikely to be effective in promoting collective action toward a truly 
effective climate regime. Early in the climate negotiations, Rathjens suggested that some 
economically weaker countries would be susceptible to coercion by economic means,78 but 
this is unlikely to be the case for many other states, such as China or lndia, which must join 
in collective action against cJ imate change if such action is to be a long-tenn success 
(China's emissions are shooting up as it develops and adopts a US-style transport 
infrastructure. lt is expected to overtake the US within two to three decades to become the 
largest source of GHG pollution.79 ) Sanctions or coercion would probably also require US 
partlclpatlOn、 but it is unlikely that the US will show much enthusiasm in this regard. Nor are 
the Europeans likely to want to take this route because it is not fair to the world's poor. This 
again begs the question of where the positive inducements一-strong ones not evidenced so 
far-will come from. 
From the start of negotiations on the climate regime、 the framework Vienna Convention 
on ozone protection and the resulting Montreal Protocol were seen as models for co l1ective 
action. The United Nations and the lntergovenunental Panel on Climate Change therefore 
suppo口ed a framework convention and subsequent protocols based on those agreements . The 
result was the FCCC and the follow-on Kyoto Protoco l. But infom1ed skeptics ne\'er shared 
the view that Montreal was a good mode l. To wit 
The MO l1 treal Protocol . . . is 110 harbinger for suppression of CO2. Economically, 
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what is at stakeis two or three orders of magnitude greater for fossil fuels than for 
CFCs, and the prospects for technological replacement of CFCs are m l1ch brighter. 
(The ozone protocol does illustrate the need for worldwide collaboration to make 
restrictions worthwhile. . . .) But in one respect it may be revealing. Developing 
countries sl1ccessfully insisted on more than $200 million ofhelp from several 
developed-nation contribl1tors. xo 
Even Benedick, a cheerleader for the Montreal Protocol who described it as "the nearest thing 
to a dry-run for a c1ima峙-change convention," acknowledged that the ozone regime "was 
made possible by special circumstances which may not be there with c1imate change."KI 
Indeed, c1 imate change differs from ozone depletion for several reasons. 82 CFCs were 
produced by a sma11 number of industries and have limited uses. Fossil fuels are produced 
everγwhere and are used by everyone in modemized socìeties. The costs of preventing 
climate change are much higher than those for saving the stratospheric ozone, and these costs 
are not evenly distribl1ted. And many important states (e .g. , Al1stralia, the US , China and 
1110st of the oil-exporting states) are sfill not enthusiastic abo l1t undertaking collective action 
to prevent c1 imate change. As The Ecollomisl put it way back in 1990: "Some countries \λ'ill 
prefer to free-ride rather than sign."X3 This remains nearly as true now as it was then. To be 
sure, resistance to action is weakening, but the pace of this weakening is glacial, and it has 
not been sl1pplanted by enthusiasm among govemments for major action. The most recent 
conference of the FCCC parties in December 2005 had trouble even agreeing on whether to 
have falks on future emissions restrictions (althol1 gh US attempts to prevent them were 
thwarted in the end), let alone moving toward implementing significant GHG cuts. lndeed, as 
Scott BalTett argues , the Kyoto Protocol is, inevitably, a failed treaty because it does not 
overcome the incentives ofstates to free ride,84 l11uch as classical CAT would anticipate 
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l11 ight happen under the circu l11stances 
Haas believed that the process of "interest recalculation" brought on by epistemic 
cO l11l11unities in the Med Plan case would be generally applicable to collective action on other 
intemational environmental problems. His assessment indicated that epistemic communities 
were important not only to the Med Plan, but also to the Montreal protocol and the European 
Community's collective policies for control of acid rain.的 However， he declared 15 years 
ago that "the distribution of costs and benefits from possible global c1 imate change is 
sllfficiently well estimated so as to inhibit the US government from delegating authority to 
ecologically inclined atmospheric scientists .州的 This succinctly describes the approach of the 
Bush administration and its industry allies even today. More generally, scientists have had 
1110re difficulty in f1uencing c1 imate change policy than in the other environmental cases due 
to the very high anticipated costs associated with action on climate change and the relatively 
high degree of scientific and economic unceltainty. They have promoted action, but witb an 
effect tbat has been far too limited. This shows again how CAT is applicable in the case of 
climate change, but in a pessimistic sense. That 芯， CAT applies to c1 imate change (as it did to 
the Medite lTanean and ozone agreements), but in this case collective action will be harder to 
achieve. The behavior Olson describes for large groups lacking incentives, or when no 5ingle 
member is willing to pay 11105t of the cost5 、 describes the circumstances sll lTounding 
international efforts to respond to climate change. From this perspective, intemational 
co l1 ective action to substal1 fially address it remains llnlikely 
Keohane has argued that , "if there is neither a hegemonic leader nor an international 
regime. prospects for cooperation are bleak indeed、 and dilcmmas of collective action are 
likely to be severe ."S7 ln the case of climate change, it is likely tl1at a more effective regime 
OIld a (benign) hegemonic leader are required. The regime cannot be very successful without 
the participation一-some argue leadership一-of the US. The US is important because it 
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produces a quarter ofthe pollutants causing global wamling (11l0re GHGs than any other 
countrγXR) and it is potentially the 11l0st effective supplier of incentives useful in gamering 
support for collective action. But、 as suggested above, robust US participation is not likely for 
some years. There is S011le grassroots action there, and some US states are 11landating GHG 
emissions limitations, but the pace and scale of action is infinitesimal compared to what is 
required to slow global wanning. lndeed, the current US govem11lent is doing a1l it can to 
prevent other countries fro111 working together to limit global warming.89 lt has put off action 
to become more energy efficient and less reliant on fossil fuels , making reducing GHG 
emissions 1110re costly as time passes-and hence creating greater resistance to action within 
the US. The longer the US puts off action, the 11l0re it will have to pay to i11lplement a truly 
effective c1 imate regi11le-and the more intense will be resistance fro111 some economic 
sectors to undel1aking the increasingly costly action required. From the beginning, the US has 
viewed the costs of a "serious attempt" to cut GHGs as exceeding the potential benefits,90 
notwithstanding the efforts of the Clinton administration to start acting on the country's GHG 
emissions. Though c1 imate change is likely to affect the US in hannflll ways (it may be doing 
so already, as sllggested by Hurricane Katrina in 2005(1 ) , most Americans wi I1 be able to 
adapt-llnlike 1110st people in the poorest pa口s of the world戶
As Sche l1 ing pllt it we l1 before the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, "in searching Ollt the 
national interests around the globe that l11ay 1110tivate cOllntries to participate in cooperative 
approaches to global wamling, 1 conc\ude that most of the countries that can afford to do 
anything may perceive veIγlittle interest of their own, and most ofthe countries that perceive 
themselves potentially vulnerable have urgent needs that leave no resources to invest in 
greenhouse abate l11ent.,,93 This attitllde is shifting in Europe; witness genuine efTorts there to 
imple l11ent some GHG emissions cuts and el11 issions trading.94 Bllt words surpass deeds, 
even as Europe and the US move further apart on this issue. A.nd there should be 110 
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expectation of more than token contributions to the climate regime from the developing 
world. Indeed, they sti l1 very much view action on c1 imate change as a question of justice. 
They point out that the wealthy countries ofthe world have caused most ofthe problem, and 
that those countries ought to act robustly before even asking the poor ones to begin limiting 
95 their own emissions of GHGs. 
Schelling outlined ten reasons why the problem of climate change would be (and 
remains) "daunting，， :9的 (1) it is a global problem that no single country can solve, even if that 
single country were willing to do so; (2) the magnitude ofpotential abatement costs are 
perceived as being "immense"; (3) there is a disparity between the equitable distribution of 
costs and the optimal distribution of abatement; (4) the climate regime must be flexible yet 
able to survive at least 50 years (an understatement); (5) al1 countries consume fossil fuels , 
thus all must participate in the regime (an overstatement given that some contribute very little 
to the problem); (6) the distribution of energy sources and use differs drastically among 
countries; (7) states have varying abilities to pay for carbon emissions abatement and to 
adjust practices to achieve that abatement; (8) the rate at which population and 扣eluse
increases di叮ers among states, and their rates of economic expansion vary; (9) nuclear 
power-the main alternative source of electricity-is expensive and unpopular in many 
countries (but this seems to be changing incrementally as the urgency of acting to address 
climate change grows and the nuclear-power industry steps up lobbying); (1 0) significant 
unce11amtles remam一-and will persist for some time. He adds, "Another hurdle is the 
difficulty of defining and determining concepts of liability, responsibility, and illegality for 
ensuring adequate compensation for the measurable ham1ful impacts of global wam1ing. ,,97 
Daunting indeed! 
Despi te the successes of the Med Plan and the Montreal Protocol , all of these potential 
obstacles suggest that the climate cbange problem wiU continue to be a much more difficult 
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collective action problem, similar to the scenarios of unsuccessful collective action 
envisioned by Olson's theory. C AT tells us that unless the disadvantages of large groups are 
overcome , "valuable institutions that would benefit a set of individuals wi l1 not necessarily be 
created. ,, 9R As George Rathjens points out pessimistically, 
because ofthe UnCe11ainty, the very long lag-times involved, and the fact that 
effective mitigative action is likely to require something approaching a global 
consensus, the prospects for near-tenn action directed at reducing global warl12 ;ng 
must be seen to be poor. These factors . . . tend to l11ake mitigation less a likely 
response to the "threat" than a delay and eventual adaptation. Public policy would 
be we l1 advised to face this reality.9l) 
This is precisely what has happened: Increasingly, intemational diplo l11acy regarding climate 
change、 and practical responses to it, are about adaptalion, not about limiting global 
wanning. 'OO Considering the circumstances surrounding the cli l11ate change problem , as Oran 
Young told us in the 1980丸 "it is no cause for surprise that the foundations for an 
intemational regime designed to protect the ozone layer are now in place, whereas a regime 
to deal with global cli l11ate change is not yet in sight. ,,1 01 V月1e now have a regime , comprising 
the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, but we do not yet have an effective one 
Such pessimism does not exclude the possibility that some significant reductions in 
GHGs wiU be possible, but it sllggests that such redllctions will often be a result of actions 
undertaken because they are justjfiable on cost-benefit grounds in their own right (e.g. , 
reduced emissions due to energy conservation prompted by a desire to improve local air 
qllality, to use less petroleum as its price increases or to improve energy security) . To be sure, 
the only effective method we have to limit c1 imate change is to reduce GHG emissions 
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associated with energy use. Given increasing desire to improve energy efficiency and to 
il11prove the local environ l11ent, the prospects of favorable changes are Velγgood. lndeed, the 
Europeans are taking substantial action in this regard. Alas, that action is vely far short of 
what is required to address limit global wanning and avert dangerous climatic change 
Conclusion 
The c1imate regime has not been a lotal failure一-an optimist would say that it is a work in 
progress that may one day have a significant positive impact on cli l11ate change-but it would 
be disingenuous to say it has been even slightly successful so far. Govemments have come 
nowhere near meeting the goal set in 1992 with the signing ofthe FCCC of returning GHG 
their emissions to 1990 levels (by 2000) and stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the at l110sphere, let alone achieving the culs in emissions of GHGs called for in the Kyoto 
Protocol, which themselves are grossly inadequate compared to what scientists sa)' is 
necessary. There is no prospect whatever of this substantially changing before the end of the 
Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012) . lt seems likely that the collective action necessarγto 
protect the Earth from climate change is not very likely in the medium tenn, either. More 
agree l11ents and promises by govemments to act are likely, and increasing action at local 
levels l11ay be about to take o fT, but those countries that enact major new conunitments will 
be few (if any). As Schelling put it a decade and a half ago, "Prospects for serious abate l11ent 
[of GHG emissions] in the near future are not goOd.' ,1 02 Prospects have not changed since 
We can expect some action so that the proble l11 will not be as bad as it would be if nothing 
were done, but we should 110t expect to see a post-Kyoto intemational agreement 
acco l11panied by major collective actio l1 toward stopping, least of all reversing, global 
wan11lng 
Despite all the new theory that has been developed since OISOI1 'S treatise on collective 
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action, his classical theory remains extremely useful in explaining the failure so far of the 
c1 imate regime, and it may be equally useful in predicting future cooperation. Olson's CAT 
suggests that an ~，加ctive climate regime is an unlikely prospect, at least until the impacts of 
climate change become much more pronounced. As Young argued quite some time ago (but 
it is as tme today as it was when he said it), "Talk of a creeping crisis with regard to global 
warming simply cannot produce the impact of the exogenous shocks . . . as a force in 
breaking the logjams that conul1only arise in institutional bargaining. This is no doubt 
frustrating to those working on a number of important collective-action problems," including 
climate change. l()J Until then, adaptation may be the preferred strategy ofmany states. 
OISOI1 said that selective incentives separate from the good being sought must be 
provided to bring about collective action . This elegantly and simply explains Russia's 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in late 2004: Despite ongoing domestic debates about 
whether ratification would benefit Russia or hurt 泣， Europe's wi l1ingness to trade support for 
Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for ratification ofthe protocol 
provided the necessary incentive. The added incentÏves of the prestige, respect and status 
WTO membership could bring, as well as moving Russia closer to the European market, 
could only help induce its accession to the agreement. lt also did not hurt that Russia really 
does not need to do much at all to meet its Kyoto commitmen俗， and likely will profit 
handsomely fro111 emissions trading. But incentives necessa可 to bring other countries on 
board are tew. Relative to the need for emissions cuts, as well as the scale ofresistance to 
action in countnes 1110St important to the regime but which are resistant to limiting, let alone 
cutt lJlg ‘ their emissions (i .e ., the US and large developing countries such as China, lndia and 
Brazil), the disincentives to joining, namely the costs to extant economic interests and 
I11S tJ tutlOl芯， is perceived to be much greater than any incentive to cut GHG emissions 
drastically. ln the cases of the large developing economies、 much larger "side payments," 
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alongside creative disincentives (e.g., trade restrictions like those used in the context of the 
Montreal Protocol) are required to entice them to limit future emissions. The Clean 
Development Mechanism and climate fund designed to help implement the Kyoto Protocol 
are puny relative to the enticements of aggressive, energy-intensive economic growth 
The Montreal Protocol and Med Plan successes relative to the climate regime fit the 
logic of CAT. ln each case, a large latent group of states was mobilized to undertake 
collective action to achieve a common good. Both have made real progress toward their 
objectives. It was those states with the greatest economic and diplomatic resources that 
worked most vigorously toward collective actÎon. In the case of the Mediterranean, France 
played this important role: "Because of its dominant position, France was able to take, and 
did take, a leadership role in the ea r1 y phase of the Med Plan. . . . During the early years of 
the program the greatest national contributions came from France; without this suppo口 the
program would not have gotten offthe ground."I04 In the case ofthe Montreal Protocol, the 
US took 011 the leadership role, pushing other states to act on its proposals to limit ODCs 
(albeit to benefit US producers ofCFC altematives). However, far from leading, in the case 
of climate change the US has lately tried to veto more aggressive action, and Europe's 
leader叫1ip has lacked vitality. Things would be worse without European efforts to lead on the 
issue, but collective action necessa可 to genuinely address cli111ate change needs 111uch more 
leadership than any states have displayed so fa r. If Europe wants to continue leading, and to 
see genuine results fro111 the leadership , it will have to work much harde r. lt 111USt 1110ve 
forthrightly to adopt even more aggressive policies that set a powerful example for the wo r1 d, 
110t least the US , despite the costs, while also encouraging through its trade and economic 
policies c\ imate-friendly productiol1 beyond its borders 
If more robust European leadership is forthc0111ing , it is possible that other states , along 
with their peoples, wi I1 increasingly define their nationaI interests一-Haas's "redetennination 
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of national interests" 105一in tenns of protecting the cOl11l11on atmospheric good and not being 
part of (or being seen as being part of) the unfair and hann臼 1 despoiling of that good. 
Scientific asseSS l11 ents suggesting that global wamling could lead, paradoxically, to drastic 
te1llperature falls in Europe may be sti1llulus for 1llore European concem and action. The 
question is whether such a "reconstruction" of national interests, arguably underway in 
among European Union members, will bear fruit in time. ln this regard one must tend toward 
pessimism. We should expect things to get much worse, not only because the scientists tell us 
change is inevitable no matter wbat is done now, but because the a l110unt of action required to 
106 put a 111叮or dent in the problem-on the order ofat least 60-70 percent cuts in GHGs ,v"-are 
simply not going to happen anytime soon-if even in our lifetimes. The cost of adapfafion 
is-rigbtly or wrongly, correctly or not-viewed by the US and some otber rich states, and 
many not-so-rich ones，的 being lower than robust action to cut GHG pollutants 
Besides much stronger leadership, what would increase the likelihood of effective 
intemational collective action on climate change? CAT suggests a number ofvariables that 
need to cbange. Knowledge and infomlation are essential in this case. Scientists should of 
course continue trying to improve our understanding of global wamling and resulting climate 
change、 and they should continue to actively cooperate to persuade govemments ofthe 
importance of acting on their findings as well as working with nongovenunental 
organizations and the l11edia to educate publics and policymakers. But knowledge brokers 
should not be neutral (a缸er all , those who oppose action have not been neutral); they should 
consciously and systematically endeavor to show govemments that national interests are 
hanned by inaction. lt needs to be demonstrated that govemments are shirking their most 
basic duty of defending tbe national interest by not acting aggressively to combat this 
probl em. lmproved science and 1110re news coverage are starting to have an effect, as noted 
earlier. ln the US , for example, localmunicipalities and some state govemments are 
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implementing laws and regulations to limit GHG emissions, having recognized that the 
federal govemment is 110t doing enough. 
Furthe l1110re, the 110tion of costs can be reinterpreted: the cost of inaction exceeds the 
cost of action . This of course requires careful consideratio l1 of those economic sectors 1110St 
affected by the necessary transitio l1 away from fossil-fuel intensive economies. This will be 
telTibly difficult, but there is still too little focus by govemments and the media 011 the 
economic advantages of transitioning to the genuine move "beyond petroleum" (to borrow 
one oil company's slogan). Alongside this is the equally difficult effort to create new 
incentives for action by the developing world, starting with the world's wealthy countries 
reducing their GHG emissions and providing much more financial assistance to developing 
countries. Withol1t this action by the developed countries to fulfill their common but 
differentiated responsibilities associated with climate change, the developing world will 
continue to fo l1 ow their bad example. 
Doing these things is obviously tremendously difficult; otherwise we would have seen 
more movement already. Looking on the bright side, intemational collective action to address 
environmental problems has been proved doable by the evolution of a number of 
intemational regimes, such as those manifested in the Montreal Protocol and the Med Plan. 
Classical CAT shows us which criteria should be met before similar success can be achieved 
in the case of climate change. Unfortunately, the comparatively favorable circu111stances that 
obtained in the ozone and MeditelTanean cases一-themselves difficult enough一-are absent in 
the case of climate change. The failure of the climate regime so far is "Iogical" from the 
perspective of classical CAT. Thus、 we would be wcll advised to prepare ourselves to 
weather the effects of climate change and to adapt to a future that is significantly different 
than tbe one we have come to know. Sadly and shamefully-but not surprisingly一-climate
change is with us to stay. 
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